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STUDY  ON 

THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  LARGE  CALIBER,  MOBILE 

ARTILLERY,  AND  MACHINE  GUNS  IN  THE 

PRESENT  EUROPEAN  WAR 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9239-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 
NOVEMBER,  1915 


509 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


♦••••••     • 

• .    •  ./  .  .    . 

•      •         •   ••    •      ♦ 


•  .  ♦  .  • 


/::.:•;•::    :  •.^ 


•   »  .  ■ 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  509. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


r 


STUDY  ON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  LARGE  CALIBER 
MOBILE  ARTILLERY  AND  MACHINE  GUNS  IN  THE 
PRESENT  EUROPEAN  WAR. 


1.  ARTILLERY. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  Phu-opean  war  two  schools  of 
artillery  thought  had  gradually  developed  among  the  European 
nations.  One  school,  fostered  by  the  French,  believed  in  the  low- 
power,  rapid-fire  field  gun  of  about  3-inch  caliber,  and  contended 
that  with  a  reasonable  supply  of  ammunition  it  was  possible  to 
render  heavy  field  or  siege  artillery  jDowerless  with  such  a  gun;  the 
second  school,  headed  by  the  Germans,  although  believing  in  the 
low-power,  small-caliber,  rapid-fire  fieldpiece,  believed  that  they 
must  be  reenforced  by  a  considerable  number  of  heavier  howitzers 
or  field  guns,  which  were  to  be  used  to  combat  the  ordinary  field- 
pieces  as  well  as  such  entrenchments  as  could  be  constructed  by 
armies  in  the  field  and  for  long-range  firing  when  necessary. 

In  general,  Germany  and  Austria  were  the  only  European  coun- 
tries that  had  developed  efficient  large-caliber  mobile  artillery  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  European  war,  but  this  war  has  devel- 
oped the  use  of  the  large-cali'ber  artillery  by  all  of  the  belligerent 
countries.  This  development  of  heavy  mobile  artillery  in  Germany, 
Austria,  and  France  is  shown  in  attached  "Notes  on  development 
of  large-caliber  mobile  artillery." 

How  the  thoughts  of  the  majority  of  the  field-artillery  officers 
influenced  the  artillery  organizatioii  of  France  and  Germany  is 
best  shown  by  their  army  oi-ganization  as  it  existed  at  the  outbreak 
of  war.  as  shown  by  the  following  table : 


Country. 

Number  of 
of  3-inch 

field  Runs 

per  1 ,060 

rifles. 

Numher  of 

li^ht  field 

howitzers 

per  1,000 

rifles. 

Number  of 

heavy  field 

howitzers 

per  1,000 

rifles. 

Total. 

France 

4.66 

0.206 
.01 

4  87 

Germany 

4.12 

1.37 

6.1 

This  table  shows  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  Germany  had  about 
(me-half  of  a  light  field  gun  (about  3-inch)  less  than  France  per 
1.000  combatants.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  had  1.37  light  field 
howitzers  per  1,000  combatants  more  than  France  had,  and  had  3 

30069°— No.  509 16  (3) 

6C7366 


heavy  field  howitzers  of  about  6-inch  caliber  for  every  1  possessed 
by  France. 

The  proportion  of  heavy  field  howitzers  was  in  reality  much  more 
than  the  table  indicates,  for,  as  is  well  known,  France  only  had  a 
total  of  twenty-four  4-gun  batteries  of  6-inch  howitzers  when  the 
war  opened,  whereas  Germany  had  more  than  one  hundred  and  ninety 
4-gun  batteries  of  6-inch  howitzers. 

We  may  say  that  the  results  of  the  war  have  justified  not  the 
French  but  the  German  organization,  and  that  as  a  result  the  French 
have  taken  up  the  German  idea  and  are  now  doing,  and  have  been 
doing  for  many  months  past,  everything  they  can  to  meet  the  Ger- 
man preparedness  in  heavy  field  artillery  material  by  equipping  their 
army  with  heavy  field  guns  and  howitzers.  It  is  of  interest  to  note 
that  the  French  6-inch  howitzer  had  a  maximum  range  of  about 
6,600  yards,  whereas  the  corresponding  German  gun,  although  older 
in  years,  had  a  maximum  range  of  7,700  yards.  In  other  words,  the 
French  were  not  only  outclassed  in  number  but  also  in  the  power  of 
the  individual  gun. 

In  addition  to  this  16-Gentimeter  (6-inch)  howitzer,  which  was 
assigned  at  the  rate  of  4  batteries  of  4  gims  each  to  each  army  corps, 
Germany  had  a  certain  number  of  heavy  gun  batteries  of  10-centi- 
meter (3.94-inch)  and  13-centimeter  (5.12-inch)  caliber  and  a  field 
28-centimeter  (11.3-inch)  mortar  battery.  The  exact  number  of  these 
batteries  is  unknown. 

The  successes  of  the  German  army  for  the  first'  four  months  of 
the  war  can  be  attributed,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  heav}'  field 
ai-tillery  with  which  they  were  equipped,  and  to  its  proper  handling. 
Our  observers  all  state  that  the  moral  actual  effect  produced  on  the 
French  in  the  opening  battles  of  the  war  by  the  heavy  German  field 
artillery  w^as  tremendous,  and  came  to  most  of  the  Frenchmen,  who 
had  been  taught  and  had  believed  that  the  75-millimeter  gun  was  the 
ruler  of  the  artillery  world,  as  a  terrific  shock.  At  the  commence- 
ment of  the  war  the  French  did  not  take  the  trouble  to  entrench  nor 
conceal  their  artillery  the  way  they  do  now ;  the  result  Avas  that  the 
heavy  German  batteries,  when  used  as  counterbatteries  and  assisted 
by  aeroplanes,  had  a  clear  field  and  managed  to  destroy  whole  bat- 
talions of  the  light  75-millimeter  French  guns  without  the  latter 
being  able  to  do  them  any  harm.  After  the  opening  battles  of  the 
war  the  French  realized  that  they  must  have  heavy  field  artillery, 
and  made  every  effort  to  obtain  it  as  soon  as  possible.  The  result 
was  that  between  August,  1914,  and  March,  1915,  they  had  sent  a 
number  of  4-gun  batteries  of  10.5-centimeter  guns  to  the  front  and 
had  adopted  and  issued  to  the  service  a  considerable  number  of  new 
15-centimeter  rapid-fire  howitzers,  and  had  started  to  construct  14- 
inch  mortars.    In  other  words,  a  few  months  after  the  war  started 

509 


the  French  school  of  artillery  thoufjht  had  completely  veered  around 
and  adoj)to(l  the  (JerniaU  artilUMv  idea. 

From  tlie  artillery  jxjint  of  view,  the,  lesson  to  be  learned  from 
the  war  is  the  same'  less(m  that  has  been  taii<i;ht  by  every  war  since 
the  discovery  of  cannon,  namely,  that  evei-ything  being  equal,  the 
side  having  the  heaviest  gun  and  the  best  ammunition-supply  sys- 
tem is  the  one  thjat  i^  best  able  to  give  the  proper  support  to  its 
infantry,  and  therefore  has  the  greatest  chance  of  success. 

Before  the  present  war  started  most  of  our  artillery  officers  be- 
lieved that  the  heaviest  field  gun  or  howitzer  which  would  be  needed 
b.y  an  army  Avas  ther  6-inc.li  howitzer  fii-ing  a  120-pound  projectile, 
and  in  justice  to.  them  it  must  be  stated  that,  with  the  exception  of 
the  German  and  Austrian  ATmies,  this  belief  was  genei-al.  They 
also  believed  that  the  function  of  the  heavy  field  guns  of  more  than 
G-inch  caliber,  which  it  was  known  Germany  and  xVustria,  possessed, 
was  to  destroy  field  forts  of  steel  and  concrete,  and  that  it  would 
not  be  possible  to  transport  either  of  these  guns  or  the  ammunition 
they  re(iuired  with  the  field  armies.  How  wrong  this  assumption 
was  is  shown  by  the  present  war  in  wdiich  the  Germans  and  Aus- 
trians  have  actually  transported  with  their  field  armies  11-inch 
howitzers.  12-inch  howitzers,  IG-inch  howitzei-s,  and  17.7-inch  how- 
itzers and  used  them,  not  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  works  of 
steel  and  concrete,  but  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  field  fortifi- 
cations, supply  depots  in  rear  of  the  line,  villages  in  which  troops 
are  quartered,  wire  entanglements  and  other  obstacles.  All  reports 
now  indicate  that  the  great  successes  obtained  by  the  German  and 
Austrian  Armies  on  the  eastern  front  were  due  in  no  small  measure 
to  the  use  of  these  enonnous  fieldpieces,  which  must  hereafter  be 
considered  as  essential  to  success  in  war. 

The  lesson  to  be  learned  as  to.  the  amoiwit  of  artillery  to  be 
assigned  to  the  different  units  has  been  taken  advantage  o-f  by  the 
General  Staff,  who,  in  the  organization  recommended  in  their  mili- 
tary policy,  have  increased  the  number  of  Field  Artillery  regiments 
with  each  Infantry  division  from  two  to  three,  and  in  the  report  of 
a  board  of  officers  which  recently  recommended  that  the  heavy  field 
artillery  with  each  field  army  be  increased  from  one  to  three  regi- 
ments. These  recommendations,  if  carried  into  effect,  will  result 
in  the  following  ])i'oportion  of  guns  per  1.000  combatants: 


Field  gun. 

Light  field 
howitzer. 

Ileavy  field 
pin  and 
howitzer. 

Total. 

Fnited  States 

2.70 
4.12 

1.35 
1.37 

1.12 
.61 

5.17 

ti  ermany 

6.10 

509 


The  percentage  of  gims  provided  by  Germany  for  her  army  is 
shown  above  for  the  purpose  of  comparison.  It  shows  that  before 
the  war  Germany  had  1.42  more  field  guns  per  thousand  combatants, 
about  the  same  number  of  light  field  howitzers,  and  0.51  of  a  heavy 
field  gun  less  than  we  now  contemplate.  The  number  of  heavy  field 
guns  given  in  the  above  table  for  Germany  does  not  include  any 
guns  heavier  than  the  16  centimeter  (6-inch  howitzer),  whereas  for  us 
it  included  the  heavier  contemplated  fieldpieces.  The  proposed  con- 
templated scheme  for  procuring  enough  guns,  ammunition,  and  other 
necessary  field  artillery  material  to  equip  1,000,000  men  will  involve 
the  expenditure  of  about  $470,000,000  over  a  period  of  8  years,  and, 
when  completed,  will  onily  provide  for  about  twice  the  number  of 
guns  used  by  Marshal  Mackensen's  army  in  the  Galician  campaign. 
In  other  words,  if  the  scheme  is  approved  by  Congress,  in  eight  years 
from  now  we  will  have  about  enough  gims  and  ammunition  and 
other  necessar}?^  stores  to  supply  two  German  field  armies. 

2.  ARTILLERY  AMMUNITION. 

Before  the  present  war  no  one  ever  dreamed  of  the  amount  of  am- 
munition that  would  be  required  to  keep  the  armies  supplied,  and  if 
he  did  dream  of  it  he  kept  his  dream  to  himself  for  fear  of  being 
called  crazy.  It  was  known  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  both 
France  and  Germany  had  a  reserve  supply  of  small-caliber  field-gun 
ammunition  of  about  2,500  rounds  per  gun,  and  a  corresponding 
amount  for  the  larger  fieldpieces  on  hand,  and  were  splendidly 
equipped  with  facilities  for  manufacturing  ammunition  of  all  kinds 
in  large  quantities.  Notwithstanding  their  reserve  supply,  which 
was  considered  immense  at  that  time,  and  their  facilities  of  manu- 
facture, both  these  nations  found  themselves  confronted  with  a  most 
serious  shortage  of  ammunition  before  the  war  had  been  going  on 
very  long,  and  in  the  case  of  France  at  least  forced  her  to  practically 
suspend  operations  for  a  protracted  period. 

At  the  present  time  the  reserve  supply  of  ammunition  to  be  kept 
on  hand  per  gun  is  considered  as  that  necessary  to  wear  out  the  gun ; 
in  other  words,  during  peace  a  sufficient  amount  of  ammunition 
should  be  accumulated  for  each  gun  to  permit  it  to  fire  as  long  as  it 
is  capable  of  doing  so.  For  a  3-inch  field  gun  this  amounts  to  about 
5,000  rounds  per  gun. 

The  question  of  ammunition  supply  has  become  such  an  important 
one  that  France  and  England  have  both  ]5laced  cabinet  ministers  in 
charge  of  it ;  and  England,  so  far  as  Ave  know,  has  not  solved  the 
problem  to  date. 

509 


3.  AERO  SERVICE  FOR  FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

Aeroplanes  are  now  jceofrnized  as  indispensable  adjuncts  of  the 
Field  Artillery.  The  followin*?  will  illustrate  some  of  the  service 
performed  by  the  Aviation  Corps: 

(1)  (Jeneral  reconnoissance  work. 

(2)  To  discover  exposed  batteries  of  the  enemy. 

(3)  To  test  concealment  of  their  own  batteries. 

(4)  To  direct  artiller}'   fire  on  enemy's  batteries  and  trenches. 
Observation  captive  balloons  aie  employed,  as  shown  by  the  fol- 
lowing report: 

The  ofTicers  wlio  conduct  tlio  fire  of  these  guns  are  well  up  in  tlie  trenches, 
connected  witii  liieir  guns  or  batteries  by  telephone  wires,  which  are  usually  run 
along  the  walls  of  the  comnnmication  trenches  and  held  in  place  by  staples.  In 
one  second-line  trench  I  counted  11  different  telephone  wires  running  out  to 
different  observation  trenches.  In  addition  to  the  observation  posts  in  the 
advance  trenches  there  is  anotlier  method  employed  by  l)oth  sides  during  the 
day ;  it  is  the  Drachen,  or  sausage-shaped  captive  balloon  which  is  sent  up  at 
daylight  and  remains  all  day  until  dark,  at  altitudes  varying,  I  should  estimate, 
from  four  to  eight  hundred  yards,  and  far  enough  in  rear  of  the  lines  to  escape 
artillery  fire,  if  directed  against  it.  The  observer  in  this  balloon  is  equipped 
witli  telephonic  communication  and  powerful  glasses.  This  silent  sentinel 
remains  up  rain  or  shine,  and  both  sides  have  the  greatest  respect  for  its  power 
of  observation.  We  were  not  allowed  to  assemble  in  groups  in  view  of  them 
at  the  front. 

These  observers  are  on  the  alert  at  all  times,  and  we  were  informed  that 
where  groups  of  5  or  10  appeared  in  the  open,  a  shell  was  usually  sent  in  their 
direction  as  a  warning  that  nothing  escaped  their  observation.  These  balloons 
are  so  generally  used  by  both  sides  that  during  a  clear  day  they  can  be  seen 
up  and  down  the  lines  as  far  as  the  eye  can  reach.  I  counted  eight  along  the 
front — Notre  Dame  de  Lorette — St.  Eloi.  They  are  used  also,  I  was  informed, 
very  often  in  directing  the  fire  of  heavy  artillery.  The  steadiness  of  this  shape 
of  balloon,  even  in  a  strong  wind,  is  quite  remarkable. 

The  "War  College  Division  has  not  made  recommendation  as  to 
aviation  equipment  needed,  as  tests  are  now  being  made  under  direc- 
tion of  the  Field  Artillery  Board  at  Fort  Sill,  Okla. 

4.  CONCLUSION. 

In  general,  the  opinion  of  foreign  officers  and  all  of  our  observers 
abroad  is  that  the  largest  calibers  are  the  most  effective  and  have 
done  the  work  in  this  war  with  high-explosive  shell. 

The  large-caliber  howitzers  and  mortars  with  high-explosive  shells 
are  employed  not  only  to  reduce  concrete  forts,  but  are  generally  used 
now  against  fieldworks  and  entrenchments  of  all  kinds. 

Every  effort  should  be  made  to  provide  our  Army  with  large- 
caliber  mobile  artillery  and  ample  aero  equipment. 

509 


8 

5.  MACHINE  GUNS. 

Machine  guns  have  phiyed  a  most  important  part  in  the  present 
war,  and  have  been  extensively  used  by  all  sides,  under  all  condi- 
tions, and  have  proven  their  worth. 

The  following  table  shows  the  number  of  machine  guns  per  1,000 
men  of  Infantry  or  Cavalry  provided  for  by  the  organizations  of 
the  European  armies  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  and  also  the  proposed 
proportion  contemplated  for  our  Army  in  the  tables  of  organization : 


Army  Corps. 

Infantry  Division. 

Reserve  Infantry 
Division. 

Cavalry 
Division. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Cavalry. 

Germany 

2 
2 
2 

2 

2 
1.32 

1.67 

France 

2.2 

2 
2 
2.12 

2.2 

1.67 

Russia 

2.20 

United  States 

3.24 

3.24 

Since  the  war  started  it  is  positively  known  that  all  the  warring- 
nations  have  greatly  increased  the  number  of  machine  guns  with 
their  armies.  Exactly  what  this  increase  has  been  is.  however, 
unlaiown.  Reports  received  from  our  observers  indicate  that  there 
is  about  one  machine  gun  for  every  30  yards  on  the  western  front. 
At  the  commencement  of  the  war  the  Germans  had  64  and  the 
French  06  guns  per  army  corps. 

6.  CONCLUSION. 

It  is  believed  that  machine  guns  at  the  rate  of  6  per  battalion 
of  Infantry  or  squadron  of  Cavalry  should  be  provided  for  our 
Army,  or  18  machine  guns  per  regiment  of  Infantry. 

NOTES    ON    DEVELOPMENT    OF    LARGE-CALIBER    MOBILE    ARTIL- 
LERY IN  EUROPEAN  WAR. 


GERMANY. 

The  Germans  had  42-centimeter  (16.5-inch)  mortars,  28-centimeter 
(11.023-inch)  Krupp  siege  howitzers,  and  21-centimeter  (8.4-inch) 
howitzers  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  These  mortars  and  howitzers 
were  employed  in  the  reduction  of  the  Belgian  fortifications. 

The  Ji.2-centimeter  {IG.o-hieh)  mortars  are  transported  b}'^  rail,  and 
spur  tracks  are  run  directly  to  the  edge  of  the  pits  in  which  they 
are  emplaced.  It  is  probable  that  a  derrick  car  is  used  to  mount 
the  parts  of  the  carriage  and  the  mortar  and  also  to  handle  the 
shell,  which  weighs  about  2,000  pounds. 

509 


In  the  recent  German-Austrian  oli'ensive  in  Galicia,  May  2  to 
June  25,  1915,  large-caliber  howitzers  and  mortars  were  used  with 
nuirked  success  against  field  intrenchments  and  field  works. 

In  addition  to  the  regulation  quota  of  artillery  pertaining  to  the  divisional 

orgiinizatioii,  there  was  asslgni'd  to  the  army  for  the  sju'cial  mission  a  large 

quantity  ol'  heavy  artillery,  ineluding  certain  21-eentimeter  howitzers,  28-cen- 

timeter  seacoast  mortars,  30.o-centimeter  mortar  batteries,  and  probably  some 

42-centimeter  mortars,  as  these  were  used  later  in  the  campaign  at  Przemysl. 
*     *     * 

The  present  war  has  shown  that  we  must  revise  our  views  as  to  what 
constitutes  "  field  "  artillery.  With  ordnance  having  calibers  as  large  as  30.5 
centimeters,  moving  steadily  along  with  the  troops,  the  artillery  features  of 
present-day  conil)ats  have  received  a  marked  dcveloinnent.  Thanks  to  this 
heavy  ordnance,  the  Germau-Austrians  were  enabled  to  break  down  the  mate- 
rial and  moral  resistance  of  the  Russians  at  all  their  strongly  prepai*ed  posi- 
tions, and  to  prepare  the  way  for  assault  of  the  infantry,  which  found  its  task 
relatively  easy.  At  the had  a  ring  trench  about  200  feet  in  di- 
ameter on  the  sunnuit  of  a  low  knoll  forming  a  closed  work  about  250  yards 
in  rear  of  a  long  rifle  trench  lower  down  a  gentle  slope.  Within  this  ring 
trench  were  seven  craters  made  by  30.5-centimeter  (12-inch)  mortar  shells, 
some  of  the  craters  intersecting  and  sections  of  the  trench  having  been  obliter- 
ated.   At  Hill  on.  the position  in  front  of the  Russians  had 

a  strong  fleldwork  consisting  of  a  double  tier  of  trenches  with  overhead  cover, 
traverses  and  splinter  proofs.  This  was  assaulted  and  carried  by  a  division 
after  about  2  hours'  artillery  preparation  by  21-centimeter  (8.25-inch)  howit- 
zers and  30.5-centimeter  (12-inch)  mortars,  with  almost  negligible  losses. 
This  work  was  inspected  before  the  field  had  been  cleared,  and  it  was  easy 
to  understand  how  demoralized  and  shaken  its  defenders  must  have  been  in 
consequence  of  the  effective  artillery  fire.  About  100  corpses  lay  in  or  close 
to  the  trenches,  most  of  them  terrildy  mangled,  even  with  clothes  torn  from  the 
body  by  the  blast  which  occasionally  blew  them  out  of  the  trenches  on  the 
gi-ound  in  the  rear.  Whole  sections  of  the  parapet  were  obliterated  and 
splinter  proofs  were  wrecked.  This  work  was  built  along  the  edge  of  a  pine 
groove  which  was  almost  leveled  to  the  gi'ound  by  the  artillery  fire.     Again 

at  ,  the  work  on  knoll  ,  to  the  west  of ,  a  very  strongly  built 

fieldwork  with  strong,  wide  wire  entanglements,  was  bombarded  for  an  hour 
with  heavy  artillery  with  similar  effects  to  those  described  above.  The  at- 
tack of  field  fortifications  by  12-inch  ordnance  is  a  novel  feature  in  war,  but 
in  no  other  way  can  the  strongly  built  positions,  which  an  enemy  can  build 
in  a  few  days,  be  prepared  for  assault  by  infantry.  The  transport  of  such 
heavy  field  ordnance,  and,  more  particidarly  of  the  neetlful  anununition  supply, 
of  course,  presents  tremendous  difliculties,  and,  without  fairly  good  roads,  is 
impracticable     *     *     *. 

During  long  trips,  on  four  different  da.vs,  over  practically  all  the  roads  be- 
tween the  and  ,  military  transportation  of  evei-y  kind,  from  the 

light,  native  country  wagon,  hauled  by  two  diminutive  hor.ses,  to  the  heavy 
motors,  hauling  28  and  30.5  centimeter  mortars,  where  encountered  moving 
steadily  to  the  front  without  any  serious  difficulties     *     *     *. 

In  their  previously  prepared  positions,  the showed  some  fine  examples 

of  technical  work,  their  fire  trenches  being  invariably  provided  with  overhead 
cover,  and  with  plenty  of  splinter  proofs  close  at  hand.  It  was  only  because 
of  their  free  use  of  the  heaviest  artillery  that  the  German-Austrians  were  able 
to  break  the  lines. 

509 


10 

The  Germans  have,  on  several  occasions,  fired  38-centimeter  (15-inch)  shells 

into  from  a  distance,  it  is  estimated,  of  30  kilometers    (18.7  miles)  ; 

where  these  shells  have  fallen  they  have  caused  great  destruction. 

The  success  of  the  42-centimeter  mortar  and  the  excellent  results 
secured  from  this  weapon  have  steadily  spurred  the  Krupp  Co.  on 
to  developing  even  larger  and  better  calibers  of  guns.  It  is  claimed 
that  the  Krupp  Co.  has  now  perfected  the  54-centimeter  (21.26-inch) 
gun  with  a  range  of  about  38  miles. 

AUSTRIA. 

The  Austrian  army  infantry  division  had,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  about 
42  field  guns  and  howitzers  per  division  of  12,000  rifles.  This  percentage  is 
exclusive  of  the  corps  artillery  which  is  composed  of  8  heavy  howitzers. 

As  the  war  went  on  the  number  of  batteries  has  been  increased  in  various 
ways  until  there  are  now  probably  50  field  guns  per  division.  The  corps  artil- 
lery remains  as  at  the  beginning,  but  the  field  army  artillery,  composed  of 
24,  30.5  and  45  centimeter  (17.7-inch)  mortars,  is  being  constantly  increased 
and  is  used  as  field  artillery. 

The  Austrians  are  using  their  large  guns  up  to  45  centimeter  (17.7-inch) 
against  fieldworks,  field  guns,  storage  depots,  railway  stations  and  villages, 
where  troops  are  quartered,  and  to  tear  up  barbed  wire  and  other  entangle- 
ments.    Tliese  uses  are  made  because  the  guns  are  available. 

The  writer  visited  three  forts  of shortly  after  the  fortress  was  cap- 
tured. The  Germans  had  used  42-centimeter  mortars  to  prepare  the  forts,  but 
what  part  of  the  destruction  of  the  concrete  work  was  done  by  the  German 

shells  or  what  part  by  the  when  they  surrendei-ed  the  fortress  to  the 

is  not  known,  but  it  may  be  stated  that  the  moral  effect  of  the  bombard- 
ment was  very  great,  for  the defense  was  weak  when  the  infantry  assault 

took  place. 

The had  very  few  guns  of  position  in and  the  mobile  artillery 

was  reduced  as  much  as  possible  to  provide  field  artillery  for  the  field  army. 
In  one  artillery  position  were  found  two  8-centimeter  field  guns  and  a  5-inch 
gun  stood  on  the  road  nearby,  showing  that  it  had  been  in  use  in  the  vicinity. 
In  one  of  the  forts  there  was  a  rapid-fire  gun  pedestal  mount  of  3-inch  caliber. 
These  were  the  only  guns  seen. 

The  writer  has  seen  the  effect  of  fire  of  the  30.5  centimeter  (12-inch)  and  45 
centimeter  (17.7-inch)  mortars  on  semipermanent  earthworks.  The  craters  on 
tlie  hill  in  rear  of  the  line  of  works  were  20  feet  deep  and  30  feet  in  diameter, 
and  the  blast  from  the  explosion  of  the  shells  must  have  been  tremendous.     The 

usual  killing  radius  mentioned  by  officers  was  200  meters,  but  it  is 

scarcely  that  great,  but  it  is  great  enougli  to  cause  the to  have  a  profound 

respect  for  the  "  ammunition  wagons,"  as  the  soldiers  called  them. 

Artillery  fire  is  very  effective  when  the  target  is  suitable;  for  instance,  en- 
fihiding  artillery  fire  is  feared.  It  is  to  be  doubted  whether  the  3-inch  gun 
produces  the  effect  on  moving  lines  in  the  open  which  might  be  expected;  but 
the  heavy  shell  fire  from  field  howitzers  is  very  effective  as  a  morale  destroying 
agent. 

609 


11 

FRANCE. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war.  the  mobile  artillery  consisted  of  substan- 
tially the  following  calibers: 

C5-mlllimeter  (2.56-inch)  mountain. 
7r)-niillinieter  (2.92-iiich)  fiold  guns. 
ISa-niilliincter  (6.1-incli)  rapid-firo  Riniaillio  ;:un. 

The  following  artillery,  considered  as  obsolete  at  outbreak  of  war, 
was  i)ut  in  action  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  superiority  of  the  Ger- 
man heavy  artillery  was  demonstrated: 

Old  material : 

120-millinieter  (4.73-inclO  long  and  short  gun. 
155-millimeter  (6.107-inc-h)  long  and  short  gun. 
220-millimeter  (8.G6-inch)  mortar. 
270-millimeter  (lO.GG-inch)  mortar. 

About  one  month  before  the  outbreak  of  war,  G  regiments  of  105- 
niillimeter  (•J:.14-inch)  guns  were  authorized,  but  the  guns  were  not 
read}'  for  issue  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  Since  the  outbreak  of 
war  these  regiments  have  been  furnished  with  the  lOo-millimeter 
(4.14-inch)  guns,  and  the  following  other  calibers  have  been  in- 
troduced : 

150-millimeter  (G-inch)   Schneider  rapid-fire  howitzers. 

2G0-millimeter  (10.5-inch)  howitzers. 

305-millimeter  (12-inch)  navy  gun,  mounted  (in  i-.iilway  carriage. 

340-millimeter  (13.8-inch)  navy  giui,  moimted  on  railway  carriage. 
The  French  have  been  making  a  new  370-millimeter  (14.G-inch)  mortal*.     Six 
or  eight   have  been  completed  and  are  to  be  sent  into  the  field  immediately 
This  piece  was  under  study  when  the  war  broke  out,  and  is  comparatively 
simple  in  construction ;  the  trials  have  given  most  satisfactory  results. 

The  75-millimeter  field  gun  is  now  seldom  used  by  the  French  in 
bombarding  field  entrenchments. 

509 

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